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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
CaseNo.20040965-CA
v.
PAUL ANTHONY ARMIJO,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from a conviction for illegal possession or use of a controlled
substance (meth), a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)
(West 2004), in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable Dennis
M. Fuchs presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004).
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Exigent circumstances. When a dozen officers, approaching a suspected drug

house before dawn in full raid gear and armed with a knock-and-announce warrant, perceived
that the residents may have been alerted to their approach by a phone callfroma passing car,
did exigent circumstances justify the officers' forcible entry immediately after knocking and
announcing?

Standard of review. Whether exigent circumstances justified officers' entry into a
home is a legal conclusion reviewed for correctness. Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13,
% 9. The factual findings underlying the district court's decision are reviewed under a clearly
erroneous standard. State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94,^f 11, 100 P.3d 1222. The application
of the legal standard to those facts is reviewed for correctness. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95,^[
12, 103P.3d699.
2.

Suppression. Must the evidence be suppressed where the knock-and-announce

rule is not "fundamental," the officers did not act in bad faith, and no causal link ties the
alleged illegality to discovery of the evidence?
Standard of review. Whether suppression is the appropriate remedy for violations of
the Fourth Amendment presents a question of law, reviewed for correctness. State v. Stevens,
570 N.W.2d 593, 595 (Wis. App. 1997). Whether suppression is the appropriate remedy
under the Utah suppression statute also presents a question of law, reviewed for correctness.
See State v. Lowder, 889 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1994).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
U.S. CONST., amend. IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.

2

Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-210 (West 2004). Force used in executing
warrant—When notice of authority is required as a prerequisite.
When a search warrant has been issued authorizing entry into any building,
room, conveyance, compartment, or other enclosure, the officer executing the
warrant may use such force as is reasonably necessary to enter:
(1) if, after notice of his authority and purpose, there is no response or he is
not admitted with reasonable promptness; or
(2) without notice of his authority and purpose, if the magistrate issuing the
warrant directs in the warrant that the officer need not give notice. The magistrate
shall so direct only upon proof, under oath, that the object of the search may be
quickly destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, or that physical harm may result to any
person if notice were given.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-212 (West 2004). Evidence seized pursuant to
warrant not excluded unless unlawful search or seizure
substantial—"Substantial" defined
(1) Property or evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant may not be
suppressed at a motion, trial, or other proceeding, unless the unlawful conduct of
the peace officer is shown to be substantial.
(2) Any unlawful search or seizure shall be considered substantial and in bad
faith if the warrant was obtained with malicious purpose and without probable
cause or was executed maliciously and willfully beyond the authority of the
warrant or with unnecessary severity.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by Information dated 15 December 2003 with four counts
of assault on a peace officer and one count each of disarming a peace officer, unlawful
possession of a controlled substance, and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia:
Count I

Disarming a peace officer , a first degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.8 (West 2004);

Count II

Unlawful possession of a controlled substance , a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West
2004);
3

Count III

Assault on a peace officer, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4 (West 2004);

Count IV

Assault on a peace officer, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4 (West 2004);

Count V

Assault on a peace officer, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4 (West 2004);

Count VI

Assault on a peace officer, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4 (West 2004);

Count VII

Unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia
, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (West
2004).

R. 3-5. Defendant was bound over on counts one through six only. R. 5, 35-36.
Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence on the ground that "officers failed to
knock and announce their presence and purpose prior to entering the house to search." R.
59. He also filed a motion to quash the bindover. R. 67-74. After an evidentiary hearing and
a motion hearing, the district court denied both motions. R. 104-09, 125.
Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine, a third
degree felony. R. 138-39. He was sentenced to an indeterminate term not to exceed five
years. R. 168. The prison term was suspended and defendant was ordered to serve 365 days
in jail without credit for time served, and to pay a fine of $1,025. R. 168-70.
Defendant timely appealed. R. 172-73.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Before dawn on 4 December 2003, a dozen officers in "raid gear" or "SWAT gear"
executed a search warrant at the home of Angela Gallegos in Magna, Utah. R. 200: 6-11,28,
38; R. 201: 7, 11, 15; R. 216,221.*
Detective Jason Watkins had obtained the search warrant two days earlier. R. 224-26
(addendum A). His affidavit states that he has reason to believe that evidence of drug crimes
would be found, including marijuana, methamphetamine, currency, drug records, and
firearms. R. 216-17 (addendum A). Mario Cabrera, a former resident of the home reportedly
selling methamphetamine out of it, had a criminal history including assault, aggravated
burglary, and resisting an officer. R. 219-21. He also had two active arrest warrants. R. 221.
The search warrant authorized a search "anytime day or night," but not a no-knock entry. R.
225-26.
When the officers were about one house north of the target residence, a car approached
from the south and started to turn into defendant's driveway; as it did so, its headlights
illuminated the officers coming up the sidewalk. R. 201: 7-8, 13-14,17. The occupants of
the car appeared to see the officers and, instead of entering the driveway, they continued

1

Although the district court refers several times to "Armijo's home" or "defendant's
home," R. 99,103; see also R. 122, the references seem inadvertent. The record establishes
that defendant did not own a home and was residing with his parents in Kearns, Utah at the
time of his arrest. See R. 19-20.
5

down the street. R. 201: 8, 14, 17. Officer Brent Jex noticed that the car's passenger was
on the phone. R. 201: 8. He told the other officers, "He is on the phone." R. 201: 8.
The officer in charge, Sergeant Kevin Matthews, told Detective Mike Ikemiyashiro that
"there was a light and movement from the home." R. 200: 19. Detective Ikemiyashior
himself was watching the car drive off. Id. That night, Sergeant Matthews also told
Detective Watkins that, just after the car drove off, he saw a light come on in the basement
of the house. R. 201: 19. Sergeant Matthews concluded that the officers had been "burned"
and that their "approach had been compromised." R. 200: 7-8. That is, "the people in the
house might have realized that [they] were there to serve a search warrant." R. 200: 20. He
said, "We are burned. We are burned. Execute." R. 201: 12, 17.
The officers walked briskly towards the house. R. 200: 9; R. 201: 9, 17. Sergeant
Matthews knocked loudly on the front door and started yelling out, "Sheriffs office, search
warrant"; without waiting for the door to be answered, the officers breached the door with
a ram and entered. R. 200: 9, 20; R. 201: 18, 20. As each officer entered, he or she called
out, "Police, search warrant." R. 201: 9; R. 200: 9, 21. Detective Watkins, the first officer
in, entered a main floor bedroom and found a couple of people. R. 201: 18.
Detective Ikemiyashiro scanned the living room and saw no people or threats. R. 200:
9. He continued into the kitchen, then made his way to the back of the house, where he and
Officer Brent Jex noticed a set of stairs leading down to the basement. R. 200: 9; R. 201: 10.
Detective Ikemiyashiro called out downstairs and, once additional officers arrived,
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Ikemiyashiro and Jex descended the stairs. R. 200:9; R. 201:10. Once in the basement, they
saw defendant lying on a mattress on the floor of a small bedroom, apparently asleep. R.
200: 10-11; R. 201: 10. The detective again yelled, "Police serving a search warrant," but
defendant did not react. R. 200: 11, 28. Keeping his gun trained on defendant, Detective
Ikemiyashiro looked around but saw no threats. R. 200: 11. He then kept trying to wake
defendant by nudging and shouting at him. R. 200: 11-12, 21-22; R. 201: 11.
When defendant finally awoke, he lunged at Detective Ikemiyashiro and his partner and
a struggle ensued. R. 200: 11-12. After a vigorous twenty- to thirty-second struggle the
officers handcuffed defendant. R. 200: 12-14, 23, 30-31, 39.

Eventually Detective

Ikemiyashiro and another officer transported defendant to jail, where jail officers searched
him. R. 200: 15. In the course of "dumping out papers and whatnot from within his
pockets," they pulled out a small baggy of methamphetamine. R. 200: 15-17, 21. The bag
was of a type that could be disposed of quickly. R. 201: 21.
Defendant was the only person in the basement. R. 201: 15.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Exigent circumstances. The knock-and-announce rule, in both its Fourth Amendment
and state statutory forms, requires officers serving a knock-and-announce warrant to knock,
announce their purpose, and wait a reasonable time before entering. Here, the officers
knocked and announced, but entered without waiting for a response. Their entry was

7

reasonable under both constitutional and statutory law if, as the district court found, they had
a reasonable suspicion of exigent circumstances.
The district court's finding of exigent circumstances is supportable without reference
to the challenged basement-light testimony. The officers were seen by the occupants of a car
that began to turn into the home's driveway, but then kept driving. The passenger had a cell
phone to his ear. Based on these facts alone, the officers could—indeed must—have
suspected that their approach to the house had been compromised by the passenger warning
the occupants of the house that a raid was imminent.
In addition, two of the officers were told by their superior that he had seen a light go on
in the basement. The district court did not find that the light in fact went on. Rather, it relied
on the officers' "subjective" understanding of the facts. Read in context, the district court's
findings indicate merely that it viewed the facts from the point of view of a reasonable
officer.

This is legally correct: officers need not be right in their perceptions, only

reasonable. These officers acted reasonably.
However, with or without the fact of the light going on, exigent circumstances existed.
Suppression. Assuming arguendo that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion of
exigent circumstances to justify their immediate entry, suppression is not the appropriate
remedy.
Suppression here is not justified under the Fourth Amendment. After the filing of
defendant's brief, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in a case presenting the
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issue of whether knock-and-announce violations require suppression. Based on existing law
they do not, because, though "not inconsequential/5 the interests protected by the knock-andannounce rule are not "fundamental." Moreover, the officers complied with two-thirds of
the rule, both knocking and announcing.
Suppression here is not justified under state statute. Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-210 (West
2004) requires officers serving a warrant to knock, announce, and wait for a response. Utah
Code Ann. § 77-23-212 (West 2004) specifies that evidence seized pursuant to a valid search
warrant may be suppressed only if the warrant was "executed maliciously and willfully
beyond the authority of the warrant or with unnecessary severity." The record in this case
does not establish these predicates. Accordingly, suppression is unjustified.
Finally, suppression here not justified because no causal link connects the alleged
illegality to the discovery of the evidence. Defendant's methamphetamine was not
discovered because, after knocking and announcing, the officers failed to wait for a response.
It was discovered because the officers obtained and served a valid warrant. Otherwise stated,
the methamphetamine would inevitably have been discovered once the officers arrived at the
Gallegos house with a valid warrant and the means to execute it.
Concerns that applying the inevitable discovery doctrine to knock-and-announce
violations would emasculate the rule by eliminating its deterrent effect are answered by the
Utah suppression statute, which permits suppression if police act in bad faith.

9

ARGUMENT
I.
BECAUSE THE OFFICERS REASONABLY SUSPECTED THAT
THEIR APPROACH TO A REPORTED DRUG HOUSE HAD BEEN
COMPROMISED, EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFIED THEIR
IMMEDIATE ENTRY
Defendant claims that "the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress because
an objective view of the totality of the circumstances did not support exigent circumstances."
Br. Aplt. at 9 (underlining and capitalization omitted). He relies on the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution and on Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-210 (West 2004). See Br.
Aplt. at 2. He does not rely on the Utah Constitution. Id.
The knock-and-announce rule is straightforward. "When executing a search warrant,
an officer must ordinarily give notice of his authority and purpose before entering the
premises to be searched." State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700,701 (Utah 1988). In addition, officers
must, after knocking and announcing their purpose, "wait a reasonable time before entry."
State v. Floor, 2005 UT App 320, \ 8.

See also United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 38

(2003) (holding that a wait of 15- to 20-seconds reasonable under the Fourth Amendment);
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-210 (West 2004) (authorizing entry when, after officer gives "notice
of his authority and purpose, there is no response or he is not admitted with reasonable
promptness").
The rule's history is rooted in common law tradition. The King's Bench articulated the
rule as early as 1604:
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[T]he house of everyone is to him as his castle . . . .
. . . . [But][i]n all cases when the King is a party, the sheriff (if the doors be not
open) may break [into] the party's house, either to arrest him, or to do other
execution of the King's process, if otherwise he cannot enter. But before he breaks
[into] it, he ought signify the cause of his coming and to make request to open the
doors.
. . . [F]or the law without a default in the owner abhors the destruction or breaking
[into] of any house (which is for the habitation and safety of man) by which great
damage and inconvenience might ensue to the party when no default is in him; for
perhaps he did not know of the process of which, if he had notice, it is to be
presumed that he would obey it.
Semayne's Case, 77 Eng.Rep. 194, 195-96 (K.B.1604); see Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S.
927,931-32(1995).
Three basic interests are served by the knock-and-announce rule: "(1) the protection of
an individual's private activities within his home, (2) the prevention of violence and physical
injury to both police and occupants which may result from an unannounced police entry, and
(3) the prevention of property damage resulting from forced entry." Buck, 756 P.2d at 701.
The knock-and-announce rule is embodied in both the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Utah statutory law.
Fourth Amendment. "The Fourth Amendment says nothing specific about formalities
in exercising a warrant's authorization" except insofar as it forbids "unreasonable searches
and seizures." Banks, 540 U.S. at 524 (quoting U.S. Const, amend. IV). This "general
touchstone of reasonableness . . . governs the method of execution of the warrant." United
States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71 (1998) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation where
police broke a single window in executing "no-knock" warrant). Reasonableness is "a
11

function of the facts of cases so various that no template is likely to produce sounder results
than examining the totality of circumstances in a given case; it is too hard to invent categories
without giving short shrift to details that turn out to be important in a given instance, and
without inflating marginal ones." Banks, 540 U.S. at 36 (citing Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S.
33, 39 (1996) ("[W]e have consistently eschewed bright-line rules, instead emphasizing the
fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry");

Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33

(1963) (reasonableness not susceptible to Procrustean application); Go-Bart Importing Co.
v. United States, 282 U.S. 344,357 (1931) (no formula for determining reasonableness; each
case on its own facts and circumstances)).
The common law knock-and-announce principle now "forms a part of the
reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment"

Wilson, 514 U.S. at 929.

Accordingly, "in some circumstances an officer's unannounced entry into a home might be
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 934 (emphasis added).
However, "there [is] no rigid rule requiring announcement in all instances." United
Ramirez, 523 U.S. at 70 (characterizing Wilson). Thus, while the standard generally requires
the police to announce their intent to search before entering closed premises, the obligation
could give way "under circumstances presenting a threat of physical violence," or "where
police officers have reason to believe that evidence would likely be destroyed if advance
notice were given."

Wilson, 514 U.S. at 936. "It is indisputable that felony drug

investigations may frequently involve both of these circumstances." Richards v. Wisconsin,
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520 U.S. 385, 391 (1997) (striking down Wisconsin's blanket exception to the knock-andannounce rule for felony drug investigations). Nevertheless, the court must determine on a
case-by-case basis "whether the facts and circumstances of the particular entry justified
dispensing with the knock-and-announce requirement." Id. at 394.
To justify a "no-knock" entry, "the police must have a reasonable suspicion that
knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular c ircumstances, w ould b e
dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for
example, allowing the destruction of evidence." Id. Thus, "if circumstances support a
reasonable suspicion of exigency when the officers arrive at the door, they may go straight
in." Banks, 540 U.S. at 37.
In determining reasonable suspicion, courts must look at the totality of the
circumstances of each case to see whether the officer has a particularized and objective basis
for his suspicion. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). "This process allows
officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from
and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well elude an
untrained person." Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). The likelihood of the
suspected activity "need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls
considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard."
(citations and quotation marks omitted).

13

Id. at 274

'The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective
of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." Banks,
540 U.S. at 39 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)).
In Richards, the Supreme Court unanimously determined that the police had reasonable
suspicion of exigent circumstances. 520 U.S. at 395. There, one plainclothes officer and one
uniformed officer knocked on Richards's motel room door. Id. at 388. With the chain still
on the door, Richards cracked it open and saw the uniformed officer.

Id. He quickly

slammed the door; after waiting two or three seconds, the officers began kicking and
ramming the door to gain entry. Id. They apprehended Richards and found drugsM at 389.
The Supreme Court concluded that Richards's "apparent recognition of the officers
combined with the easily disposable nature of the drugs" justified the officers' decision to
enter without first announcing their presence and authority. Id. at 396.
State statute. In Utah, the "knock-and-announce" rule is incorporated into Utah Code
section 77-23-210:
When a search warrant has been issued authorizing entry into any building, room,
conveyance, compartment, or other enclosure, the officer executing the warrant
may use such force as is reasonably necessary to enter:
(1) if, after notice of his authority and purpose, there is no response or he is
not admitted with reasonable promptness] or
(2) without notice of his authority and purpose, if the magistrate issuing the
warrant directs in the warrant that the officer need not give notice. The magistrate
shall so direct only upon proof, under oath, that the object of the search may be
quickly destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, or that physical harm may result to any
person if notice were given.
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-210 (2003) (emphasis added). As under the Fourth Amendment,
"a showing of exigent circumstances . . . will permit immediate entry." State v. Floor, 2005
UT App 320, If 13 (upholding search against knock-and-announce challenge).
Here, the officers here both knocked and announced their purpose before breaching
Angela Gallegos's door. See R. 200: 9, 20; R. 201: 18, 20. This reduced any potential for
violence that may have resulted from an unannounced entry, which could lead a home's
occupants to believe that criminals were breaking in and they had a right to resist. However,
after knocking and announcing, the officers immediately breached the door. Id. Defendant's
challenge focuses on this fact.
A.

Evidence exclusive of the basement light established exigent
circumstances.

The district court concluded that "it was reasonable for the officers to believe that
exigent circumstances arose, necessitating their rapid entry into the home for fear of
destruction of evidence and the safety of the officers." R. 123 (addendum B). This finding
is supported in the record even without considering testimony that a basement light went on.
When the officers were about one house north of the target residence, a vehicle
approached from the south and started to turn into defendant's driveway; as it did so, its
headlights illuminated the officers coming up the sidewalk. R. 201: 7-8, 13-14, 17. It
appeared that the occupants of the car saw the officers and, instead of entering the driveway,
continued down the street. R. 201: 8, 14, 17. Officer Brent Jex noticed that the car's
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passenger was on the phone. R. 201: 8. Jex told the other officers, "He is on the phone."
R.201:8.
These uncontested facts, without more, establish reasonable suspicion of exigent
circumstances. The fact that a car was about to pull into the driveway of a known drug house
at a very early hour could cause a reasonable officer to suspect that occupants of the car knew
the occupants of the house, or had come to purchase drugs at the house, or both. The fact
that the car's lights illuminated the officers in full SWAT regalia could cause a reasonable
officer to suspect that the driver and passenger had seen the team and understood that a raid
on the house was imminent. The fact that the passenger had a phone to his ear could cause
a reasonable officer to suspect that the passenger was at that moment warning the occupants
of the house to dispose of the drugs that were the target of the search. Indeed, on these facts,
it would have been unreasonable not to at least suspect that the officers had lost control of
the situation. Nothing more is required.
An exigency exists if full compliance with the knock-and-announce rule "would be
dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for
example, allowing the destruction of evidence." Richards, 520 U.S. at 394. Being "burned,"
as Sergeant Matthews put it, creates such an exigency. R. 201: 12, 17. If the occupants of
a house are alerted to the approach of a SWAT team, the officers lose "the tactical element
of surprise," thereby increasing the peril they face in executing the warrant. State v. Bamber,
630 So.2d 1048, 1051 (Fla. 1994) (quoting Charles P. Garcia, The Knock and Announce

16

Rule: A New Approach to the Destruction-of-Evidence Exception, 93 Colum.L.Rev. 685,
703-05 (1993)). Obviously, knocking and announcing also results in loss of surprise. The
difference is that knocking and announcing allows the SWAT team to reveal its presence on
its own terms, in keeping with its tactical plan, after it is poised to seal and search the house.
In contrast, here, after the officers' cover was blown, their "staging plan was in disarray."
People v. Murphy, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 269, 293 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2004) (Benke, acting P.J.,
dissenting). They lost the opportunity to set up around the house to prevent occupants from
fleeing by a back door or side window. Nor were they positioned to hear the familiar toilet
flush signaling the disposal of drugs. Instead, they were still some 25 feet from the house.
R.201:13.
The district court's finding of exigency is thus supportable even without reference to
the challenged fact that Sergeant Matthews saw a light come on.
B.

The court reasonably relied on testimony that the lead officer saw a
basement light come on.

In addition to the facts cited above, the district court relied on hearsay reports of the
basement light going on: "Several detectives testified that their on scene supervisor, Sergeant
Mathews, said that as the vehicle drove off he observed a light come on in the basement of
Defendant's home." R. 122 (addendum B);

see also R. 99 (addendum C) ("Officer

Matthews reported that a light then came on in the basement of Armijo's home."). Defendant
"does not dispute that Sergeant Mathews csaid' he saw a light come on in the basement but
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instead disputes that when viewed objectively the weight of the evidence supports that a light
actually came on." Br. Aplt. at 18. The court properly relied on this factor.
That the light went on was shown by the hearsay statements of the lead officer on the
raid, Sergeant Matthews. While Detective Ikemiyashiro was watching the car, Sergeant
Matthews, told him that "there was a light and movement from the home." R. 200: 19; see
also R. 200: 8. That night, Sergeant Matthews also told Detective Watkins that just after the
car drove off, he saw a light come on in the basement of the house. R. 201: 19.

2

When

Detective Kelly Stephen Smith entered the room where defendant was, he later recalled, the
room was lit with light coming from the hallway. R. 200: 40-41. When asked whether a
light fixture or night-light was on in the room, he testified, "it seemed like there was a lowlevel light on inside the room, but I can't remember exactly what the lighting was like." R.
200:40-41.
No one testified that Sergeant Matthews' report of seeing a light was false. Nor did any
testimony state, suggest, or imply that Sergeant Matthews was lying. However, some
testimony did suggest that he was mistaken. The district court was troubled by the fact that
when the officers entered the basement they found only defendant, and defendant appeared
to be—indeed Detective Ikemiyashiro believed him to be—asleep. See R. 200:21; R. 203:

2

Sergeant Matthews was unavailable to attend the evidentiary hearing, so the
prosecutor stated, "So we decided to proceed in the matter, to allow the hearsay in." R. 201:
22. When the court asked, "In other words, basically, if he had testified, he would testify that
he saw the light come on?" Defense counsel responded, "That's right." Id.
18

5. The district court stated, "What troubled me the most was the fact that the light
supposedly came on in the basement, the person in the basement, they say, was sound asleep.
In fact, they had trouble waking him up. It does trouble me. It troubles me greatly." R. 203:
5. What the court said next troubles defendant greatly: "But again, I think I'd have to look
at it subjectively as they would have seen it under that situation. And I think this court, at
least, can make a determination that they would have thought that there were exigent
circumstances and that they needed to go into the home." R. 203: 5. Earlier the court had
stated, "But I think the court has to make a decision, a subjective decision, or look at it
subjectively as the peace officer looked at it . . . in this particular situation." R. 203: 3.
The testimony was not necessarily inconsistent on this point. The light may have been
turned on by someone in the basement who escaped out a back or side door or back window
before the officers reached the house, breached the door, secured the main floor, and
descended to the basement. Or the light may have been on from the outset, but Sergeant
Matthews noticed it only after the car incident. Or Sergeant Matthews may have seen a
reflection of the car's headlights in the basement window. Or defendant himself may have
turned the light on, then feigned sleep when the police arrived.
Defendant relies heavily on the court's repetition—at least four times—of the word
"subjectively." R. 203: 3-5. However, read in context the court seems to be saying that it
must view the facts from the point of view of a reasonable officer. The court states, for
example, "I have to look at that as subjectively as the officers would look at it." R. 203: 4.
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The likely reading of this statement is that if, for example, Sergeant Matthews reasonably but
incorrectly believed he saw a basement light go on, the district court should factor the light
into the exigency analysis. In this the district court was correct: reasonable suspicion is based
on the facts as the officer reasonably believed them to be. "Officers can have reasonable, but
mistaken, beliefs as to the facts establishing the existence of probable cause or exigent
circumstances .. ." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001).
The presence of the basement light is therefore properly included in the exigency
analysis. As stated above, however, other facts establish exigent circumstances here to the
modest level of reasonable suspicion. The basement light is cumulative.
Where "circumstances support a reasonable suspicion of exigency when the officers
arrive at the door, they may go straight in." Banks, 540 U.S. at 37. The record here
establishes "a reasonable suspicion of exigency." Their immediate entry was thus justified
under both the Fourth Amendment and state statute.
II.
SUPPRESSION IS NOT JUSTIFIED BECAUSE THE KNOCK-ANDANNOUNCE RULE IS NOT "FUNDAMENTAL," THE OFFICERS DID
NOT ACT IN BAD FAITH, AND NO CAUSAL LINK TIES THE
ALLEGED ILLEGALITY TO DISCOVERY OF THE EVIDENCE
Defendant claims that "[b]ecause the 'knock-and-announce rule' falls within the
fundamental right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, violation of the rule
requires suppression." Br. Aplt. at 13. On the contrary, even if the district court erred in
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finding that the officers reasonably suspected exigent circumstances, neither federal
constitutional nor state statutory law requires suppression.
A.

Suppression is not appropriate h ere u nder t he F ourth A mendment
because the knock-and-announce requirement is not fundamental.

The United States Supreme Court has never decided whether a Fourth Amendment
knock-and-announce violation requires suppression. In fact, after defendant filed his brief,
the Court granted certiorari in a case presenting this very question. See Hudson v. Michigan,
125 S.Ct. 2964 (2005).3

3

Petitioner Hudson phrases the question presented as one of "inevitable discovery":

Does the inevitable discovery doctrine create a per se exception to the
exclusionary rule for evidence seized after a Fourth Amendment "knock and
announce" violation, as the Seventh Circuit and the Michigan Supreme Court
have held, or is evidence subject to suppression after such violations, as the
Sixth and Eight Circuits, the Arkansas Supreme Court, and the Maryland Court
of Appeals have held?
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 2005 WL 856040. Respondent Michigan phrases the question
as one of "causality":
Exclusion of evidence is only appropriate when to fail to exclude would put
the police in a better position than they would have been had the constitutional
error never occurred. There is no element of causality between a knock-andannounce violation and the seizure of contraband pursuant to a valid search
warrant and search of proper scope. Does the Fourth Amendment require the
exclusion of evidence because of a violation of principles of announcement
despite a lack of causal connection between any police error and the discovery
of the contraband?
Answer of Respondent, 2005 WL 910329.
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Lower courts are split. The Seventh Circuit and the Michigan Supreme Court have held
that the inevitable discovery doctrine creates a per se exception to the exclusionary rule for
evidence found after a "knock and announce" violation because the police presumably would
have found the same evidence if they had knocked and announced. See United States v.
Langford, 314 F.3d 892, 894-95 (7th Cir. 2002), cert denied, 540 U.S. 1075 (2003); People
v. Stevens, 597 N.W.2d 53, 59-62 (Mich. 1999), cert denied, 528 U.S. 1164 (2000).
However, the Sixth and Eighth Circuits and the courts of last resort in Arkansas and
Maryland have rejected claims that the inevitable discovery doctrine should insulate "knock
and announce" violations from the exclusionary rule. See United States v. Dice, 200 F.3d
978, 984-85 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Marts, 986 F.2d 1216, 1220 (8th Cir. 1994);
Mazepinkv. State, 987 S.W.2d 648,657 (Ark.), cert denied, 528 U.S. 927 (1999); State v.
Lee, 821 A.2d 922, 931-946 (Md. 2003).
As applied by Utah courts in Fourth Amendment cases, violation of the knock-andannounce rule does not always require suppression. See State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700 (Utah
1988); see also State v. Ribe, 876 P.2d 403,410 (Utah App. 1994) (declining to adopt a per
se rule of suppression for violations of rules of criminal procedure) (citing State v. Rowe, 850
P.2d 427, 429 (Utah 1992); State v. Fixel, 744 P.2d 1366, 1368 (Utah 1987)). The Fourth
Amendment may require suppression when illegal police conduct implicates a fundamental
violation of a defendant's rights: "It is only where the violation also implicates fundamental,
constitutional concerns, is conducted in bad-faith or has substantially prejudiced the
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defendant that exclusion may be an appropriate remedy." Ribe, 876 P.2d at 406 (holding
that, absent exigent circumstances, clear violation of knock-and-announce requirement
justified suppression) (quoting Rowe, 850 P.2d at 429) (emphasis in original; footnotes
omitted). Furthermore, "procedural violations in the execution of search warrants do not
require suppression of the evidence seized."

Rowe, 850 P.2d at 429. For example,

"suppression of the evidence is not justified when an unauthorized no-knock entry is made
when no one is at home." Buck, 756 P.2d at 702.
In Buck, police obtained a warrant to search Buck's home, but it did not excuse them
from the knock-and-announce requirement. Id. at 700. Ten officers forcibly broke into the
home through both the front and back doors without knocking or announcing their authority.
Id. at 701. Police found no one at home, but found plentiful drugs. Id.
The supreme court noted that the knock-and-announce rule is designed to protect three
interests: (1) privacy, (2) prevention of violence, and (3) prevention of property damage. Id.
at 701. However, when the premises are unoccupied, the only interest implicated is the third,
"prevention of property damage, which usually is the least significant interest of the three."
Id. at 701. T he c ourt concluded t hat" § 7 7-23-10 c ontemplated t hat, a bsent n o-knock
authority or exigent circumstances, an officer should knock and announce his authority even
if no one is on the premises." Id. at 702. "Nevertheless, suppression of the evidence is not
justified when an unauthorized no-knock entry is made when no one is at home." Id.
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The court found no Fourth Amendment violation. Id. at 703. Buck claimed "only that
the manner of entry was unlawful," and the manner of entry "had nothing to do with the
extent of the intrusion on defendant's privacy." Id. Significantly, the court noted, "Although
[the officers'] unannounced entry was not authorized by the warrant, it did not contribute
appreciably to the invasion of privacy already authorized by the warrant." Id.
However, defendant here argues that "[w]ith the holdings of Wilson and Richards, the
United States Supreme Court has clarified that a violation of the "knock-and-announce" rule
is a fundamental violation of a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights." Br. Aplt. at 13
(citing Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934, Richards, 520 U.S. at 393).
Wilson does not establish the knock-and-announce rule as "fundamental." It holds
merely that the knock-and-announce principle "is an element of the reasonableness inquiry
under the Fourth Amendment." Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934. It is "among the factors to be
considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search or seizure." Id. Thus, "in some
circumstances an officer's unannounced entry into a home might be unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment." Id. The Court was careful not to hold "that every entry must be
preceded by an announcement," and it warned that the Fourth Amendment "should not be
read to mandate a rigid rule of announcement that ignores countervailing law enforcement
interests." Id.
Nor does Richards enshrine the knock-and-announce rale as fundamental. It speaks of
the interests implicated by an unannounced, forcible entry with telling understatement. For

24

example, the Court observes that these interests "should not be unduly minimized/'
Richards, 520 U.S. at 393, n. 5 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Court stops short of
describing these interests as "consequential," preferring instead the measured "not
inconsequential." Id.
In sum, neither the United States Supreme Court nor any Utah appellate court has held
that the interests protected by the knock-and-announce rule are fundamental.
In keeping with the foregoing caselaw, the district court ruled that "dispensing with the
knock and announce requirement while serving [defendant] did not implicate his
fundamental rights." R. 103. The court reasoned that it was not the mode of entry, but the
entry itself, which defendant does not challenge, that implicated his privacy rights. Id. As
in Buck, "the officers had the right to forcibly enter if the defendant did not respond to the
knock in a reasonable time," and "it is likely he would not have responded within a
reasonable time." Id. Furthermore, "[n]othing in the record attempts to demonstrate either
that the search would not have occurred but for the failure to knock and announce or that the
officers intentionally disregarded the rule out of bad faith." Id.
Here Angela Gallegos's house was not unoccupied. Nevertheless, as ivBuck, only "the
manner of entry was unlawful," and the manner of entry "had nothing to do with the extent
of the intrusion on defendant's privacy." Buck, 756 P.2d at 703. It is defendant's position
that he slept through not only Sergeant Matthews's knock on the front door, but also his
breaking it down. If so, it is difficult to imagine how his fundamental rights were violated.
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He certainly would not, given an additional 2 0 se conds, have responded to the knock.
Indeed, the only difference between the actual entry and the entry he claims should have been
made is that he would have slept 20 seconds longer.
Accordingly, suppression is not justified under the Fourth Amendment.
B.

Suppression is not appropriate here under state statutory law because
the officers did not act in bad faith or with unnecessary severity.

In addition to his Fourth Amendment claim, defendant asserts a claim under Utah Code
Ann. § 77-23-210 (West 2004) (the no-knock statute). See Br. Aplt. at 8. Again, suppression
is not justified on these facts.
Section 77-23-210 specifies the knock-and-announce requirement in Utah:
When a search warrant has been issued authorizing entry into any building,
room, conveyance, compartment, or other enclosure, the officer executing the
warrant may use such force as is reasonably necessary to enter:
(1) if, after notice of his authority and purpose, there is no response or he is
not admitted with reasonable promptness; or
(2) without notice of his authority and purpose, if the magistrate issuing the
warrant directs in the warrant that the officer need not give notice. The magistrate
shall so direct only upon proof, under oath, that the object of the search may be
quickly destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, or that physical harm may result to any
person if notice were given.
In addition to defining the knock-and-announce rule in Utah, our Legislature has specified
when a violation of that statute requires suppression. Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-212 (West
2004) provides that evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant may be suppressed only if
the officer's misconduct is substantial and in bad faith:
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(1) Property or evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant may not be
suppressed at a motion, trial, or other proceeding, unless the unlawful conduct of
the peace officer is shown to be substantial.
(2) Any unlawful search or seizure shall be considered substantial and in bad
faith if the warrant was obtained with malicious purpose and without probable
cause or was executed maliciously and willfully beyond the authority of the
warrant or with unnecessary severity.
§ 77-23-212.4 In the present context, the rule of this section is that challenged evidence may
be suppressed only if the officer executed the search in bad faith, to wit, "maliciously and
willfully beyond the authority of the warrant or with unnecessary severity." Id.5
The record here does not establish that the officers obtained the search warrant "with
malicious purpose and without probable cause" or executed it "maliciously and willfully
beyond the authority of the warrant or with unnecessary severity." Id. Indeed, they
indisputably complied with two-thirds of the knock-and-announce rule and dispensed with
the third requirement only when they believed they had been "burned." At most, defendant

4

The predecessor to this statute appeared at Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-12(g) (1982).
This provision, known as the Fourth Amendment Enforcement Act, was held to violate the
Fourth Amendment in State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181,186 (Utah 1987). The supreme court
held that by in effect creating a good faith exception to investigatory stops and searches, the
Act exceeded the limits of the exception to the exclusionary rule recognized in United States
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). The State here does not contend that Fourth Amendment
analysis is controlled in any degree by state statute or common law.
5

Although section 77-23-212 was not argued in the district court, it is well settled that
an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from "if it is sustainable on any legal
ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory differs from that
stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or action, and this is true even though such
ground or theory is not urged or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower
court, and was not considered or passed on by the lower court." State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT
30, f 9, 76 P.3d 1159 (quoting Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58,f 10, 52 P.3d 1158).
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has shown that, based on the facts available to the officers at the time, their suspicion that
their cover had been blown was less than reasonable. Accordingly, suppression is not
justified under state statutory law.
This result is consonant with Buck. In addition to his Fourth Amendment claim, Buck
sought suppression of the evidence under section 77-23-210 based on the fact that officers
forcibly broke into his unoccupied residence. Buck, 756 P.2d at 702. The court agreed that
the officers violated the statute, but refused the remedy of suppression: while the statute
"contemplated that, absent no-knock authority or exigent circumstances, an officer should
knock and announce his authority even if no one is on the premises," nevertheless,
"suppression of the evidence is not justified when an unauthorized no-knock entry is made
when no one is home." Id.
Likewise here, even if the officers violated the Utah no-knock statute, suppression is
not justified.
C.

Suppression is not appropriate here because the challenged evidence is
not the fruit of the alleged illegality.

Even if it were otherwise an appropriate remedy, suppression is not justified where, as
here, there is no causal relationship between the alleged police illegality and the discovery
of the challenged evidence.
"The exclusionary rule prohibits the use at trial of evidence, both primary and derivative
(the 'fruit of unlawful police conduct5), obtained in violation of an individual's constitutional
and statutory rights." State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30,^f 13, 76 P.3d 1159 (citation omitted).
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Thus, after finding a Fourth Amendment violation, the court must determine whether there
was "sufficient causal relationship" between the violation and the discovery of the evidence
to justify suppression. Ramirez, 523 U.S. at 72 n.3 (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431
(1984); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)).
A "but-for" relationship, though necessary, is insufficient. "In cases involving the
admissibility of evidence obtained as a consequence of police misconduct, the United States
Supreme Court has eschewed a 'but for' test." State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah
1990). In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963), the Supreme Court
declined to hold "that all evidence is 'fruit of the poisonous tree' simply because it would not
have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police."
Here, no "causal relationship"—not even a but-for relationship—exists between the
manner of entry and the discovery of defendant's methamphetamine. Ramirez, 523 U.S. at
72 n.3. Defendant does not allege and cannot demonstrate that but for the officers' failure
to wait 20 seconds before breaching the door, his meth would not have been discovered.
Certainly defendant would not have answered the door. We may speculate that the occupants
of the upstairs bedroom might have done so. But whether the officers entered immediately
after knocking and announcing, or 20 seconds later, defendant's meth was going to be
discovered. As in Buck, "the manner of entry in this case had nothing to do with the extent
of the intrusion on defendant's privacy." Buck, 756 P.2d at 703. Accordingly, the most
rudimentary prerequisite for suppression under any standard is absent here.
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Moreover, even if suppression were otherwise an appropriate remedy, it is not justified
where, as here, the evidence would inevitably have been discovered.6
'The exclusionary rule prohibits the use at trial of evidence, both primary and derivative
(the 'fruit of unlawful police conduct5), obtained in violation of an individual's constitutional
and statutory rights." Topanotes, 2003 UT 30,f 13 (quoting Nix 467 U.S. at 444). The
principal purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct. Id. However,
the inevitable discovery doctrine "enables courts to look to the facts and circumstances
surrounding the discovery of the tainted evidence and asks whether the police would have
discovered the evidence despite the illegality." Id. at | 14. Central to this doctrine is the
belief "that the interest of society in deterring unlawful police conduct and the public interest
in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime are properly balanced by putting
the police in the same, not a worse, position that they would have been in if no police error
or misconduct had occurred." Id. at ^f 13 (quoting Nix, 467 U.S. at 443).

6

Although inevitable discovery was not argued in the district court, it is well settled
that an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from "if it is sustainable on any
legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory differs
from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or action, and this is true even
though such ground or theory is not urged or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised
in the lower court, and was not considered or passed on by the lower court." State v.
Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, f 9, 76 P.3d 1159 (quoting Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58,lj 10, 52
P.3d 1158).
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In Utah, "'an entirely independent, alternate, intervening, appreciably attenuated
investigation aside from the tainted investigation/ is not required to prove inevitable
discovery."/</. at If 15 (quoting State v. James, 2000 UT 80,H \ 15-16, 13 P.3d 576).
The analysis must, of course, "begin with the premise that the challenged evidence is
in some sense the product of illegal governmental activity." Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 (quotation
marks and citation omitted). As noted above, that premise is absent here. In any event, mere
causation "does not end the inquiry."

Id.

"If the prosecution can establish by a

preponderance of the evidence that the [evidence] ultimately or inevitably would have been
discovered by lawful means

. . . then the deterrence rationale has so little basis that the

evidence should be received.5" Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ^ 14 (quoting Nix, 467 U.S. at 444).
"Anything less would reject logic, experience, and common sense." Nix, 467 U.S. at 444.
There will be instances where, based on the historical facts, inevitability is
demonstrated in such a compelling way that operation of the exclusionary rule is
a mechanical and entirely unrealistic bar, preventing the trier of fact from learning
what would have come to light in any case. In such cases, the inevitable discovery
doctrine will permit introduction of the evidence, whether or not two independent
investigations were in progress.
Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, f 15 (quoting United States v. Boatwright, 822 F.2d 862, 864 (9th
Cir.1987)).
Where the purportedly illegality is the failure to wait after knocking and announcing,
and the evidence is seized pursuant to a valid warrant, the evidence comes not by exploitation
of the illegality, but by a means—the warrant—free of any taint that would require exclusion.
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See State v. Zesiger, 2003 UT App 37, f 10, 65 P.3d 314 (holding that related independent
source doctrine can apply where there is a violation of a knock-and-announce warrant).
In this case, the evidence would inevitably have been discovered. The police had a
valid warrant that allowed them to search Angela Gallegos's house. They arrived at the front
door, knocked, announced their purpose, breached the door, and executed the warrant. This
search would have taken place regardless of the number of seconds the officers waited on the
doorstep. The only sense in which the failure to wait longer might have "caused" the
discovery is by giving defendant time to destroy his meth. But this is not a proper
consideration. "Suspects have no constitutional right to destroy or dispose of evidence." Ker
v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 39 (1963) (plurality opinion) (quoting People v. Maddox, 294
P.2d 6,9 (Cal. 1956), cert, denied, 352 U.S. 858); accord Segura v. United States, 468 U.S.
796, 816 (1984). In any event, defendant was sleeping, or pretending to sleep, and thus not
in a position to destroy any evidence.
Unlike Topanotes, the instant case presents a "compelling scenario . . . for discovery of
the evidence in question." Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, \ 21. The State's inevitable discovery
argument failed in Topanotes because it rested upon the assumption that "because Topanotes
was cooperative during the unlawful investigatory stop that did occur, she would have been
equally cooperative during the hypothetical, legal investigatory stop that would have
occurred." Id. at f 20. The supreme court observed that "[cjases that rely upon individual
behavior as a crucial link in the inevitable discovery chain, particularly when that behavior
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is heavily influenced by the illegality that did occur, rarely sustain an inevitable discovery
theory." Id.
In contrast, there is nothing hypothetical about what would have happened here absent
the alleged illegality. A dozen police in SWAP gear were at Angela Gallegos's front door.
After knocking and announcing, they forcibly entered. Had they waited 20 seconds, either
the upstairs occupants would have let them in, or not. Had they been let in, the officers
would have entered and executed the search warrant. Had they not been let in, the officers
would have breached the door and executed the search warrant. In either event, armed with
a valid warrant, their momentum was irreversible. Indeed, "it is hard to understand how the
discovery of evidence inside a house could be anything but inevitable once the police arrive
with a warrant." Langford, 314 F.3d at 894 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Application of the exclusionary rule here would be "a mechanical and entirely
unrealistic bar, preventing the trier of fact from learning what would have come to light in
any case." Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, If 15 (quoting Boatwright, 822 F.2d at 864). It would
violate the principle that police should be placed "cin the same, not a worse, position [than]
they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred.'" Murray v. United
States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988) (quoting Nix, 467 U.S. at 433).
While deterrence of police misconduct is a laudable goal, without the inevitable
discovery rule uthe exclusionary remedy would overdeter." Langford, 314 F.3d at 895.
Here, "whatever deterrent value may result from suppression in this case is greatly
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outweighed by society's interest in placing all relevant evidence before the jury." State v.
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256,1274 (Utah 1993) (holding that defendant's consent to search was
sufficiently attenuated from knock-and-announce violation to defeat defendant's claim that
evidence found in search should be excluded). In any event, "[t]here are both state and
federal sanctions for such violations that serve as deterrents for police misconduct that are
less severe than the exclusion of the evidence." People v. Stevens, 597 NW.2d 53,64 (Mich.
1999).
Finally, Utah's suppression statute should blunt concerns that application of the
inevitable discovery rule "would completely emasculate the knock-and-announce rule."
United States v. Dice, 200 F.3d 978,986 (6th Cir. 2000). Where suppression is sought under
state law, section 77-23-212 could be read to authorize suppression of all evidence obtained
pursuant to a warrant "executed maliciously and willfully beyond the authority of the warrant
or with unnecessary severity."
CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed.
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
The State requests oral argument. "[OJral argument is a tool for assisting the appellate
court in its decision making process," Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court ofAppeals, 2005 UT 18,
% 10, 110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between the litigant and the
bench." Moles v. Regents of Univ. of Calif, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557, 560 (Cal. 1982). In the case
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at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided by oral argument." Utah R. App.
P. 29(a)(3).
RESPECTFULLY submitted on

£

August 2005.

MARX L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

ERIC VOROS, JR
istant Attorney General
f, Appeals Division
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I hereby certify that this /5^August 2 005, y

copies of the foregoing brief of

appellee were • hand-delivered to an agent of Mmailed to the following:
DEBRA M. NELSON
RALPH W. DELLAPIANA
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
424 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Addenda

Addendum A

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
BEFORE:
MAGISTRATE

450 South State Street
ADDRESS

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss
County of Salt Lake )
The undersigned Affiant, Jason Watkins, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
That your Affiant has reason to believe:
That

on the person of Gallegos, Angela Misty Marie, D.O.B. 06-13-1979, hispanic
female, 5'5,1201bs, brown hair, brown eyes

And

on the person of Thomas, Random, D.O.B. 12-07-1981, white female, 5'6,
120 lbs, brown hair, blue eyes.

And

on the person of Cabrera, Mario A., D.O.B. 11-07-1975, hispanic male, 5'4,
1601bs, black hair, black eyes.

And

on the premises known as 2843 South 8700 West, a single family dwelling,
described as sitting on the East side of the street, facing West, and having
yellow siding, and a greenish gray roof. Thefrontdoor is located on a raised
porch, faces West, and is white in color. The house numbers 2843 are located on
the steps leading up to thefrontdoor. To include all rooms, attics, basements, and
other parts therein, the surrounding grounds, storage rooms, storage areas, trash
containers, vehicles, and outbuildings of any kind located thereon.

And

on all persons who are in the address sought to be searched at the time of the
Warrant.

In the city of Magna, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there is now certain property or
evidence described as:
1. Marijuana, further described as a green leafy substance; material related to the
possession or distribution of marijuana including bags, scales, measuring
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devices; and drug paraphernalia described as rolling papers, pipes, or other
devices used for smoking marijuana.
2.

Methamphetamine; a white crystalline substance in powder, solid or rock
form, a Schedule II controlled substance or any other illegal narcotics.

3.

Paraphernalia; to include but not limited to pipes, plastic bags, scales, and
other items commonly used to package drugs or to introduce drugs into the
human body.

4.

Residency papers; to include but not limited to utility receipts and/or bills,
rental/lease agreements, and articles showing occupancy of the premises.

5.

United States currency believed to be in close proximity to the narcotics
being searched for, and any and all items determined to be collateral or
proceeds from narcotics transactions.

6.

Narcotics records; to include but not limited to price lists, amounts sold,
times, dates, amounts purchased, who purchased,financialgain, and drug
indebtedness.

7.

Firearms; to include but not being limited to pistols, revolvers,rifles,semi
or fully automatic weapons determined to be proceeds of narcotics
transactions or used to protect narcotics activities.

8.

And any other item(s) determined to befruitsor instrumentalities of the
crime(s) of Possession and Distribution of a Controlled Substance.

and that said property or evidence:
was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed, or
has been used to commit or conceal a public offense, or
is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of committing or
concealing a public offense, or
consists of an item of, or constitutes evidence of, illegal conduct, possessed by a
party to the illegal conduct.
Furthermore your Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is evidence
ofthecrime(s) of
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Possession and Distribution of a Controlled Substance.
The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant are:
Your Affiant, Detective Jason B. Watkins, is currently employed by the Salt
Lake County Sheriff's Office, Special Investigations Division. Your Affiant has been
given the responsibility to investigate complaints occurring in Salt Lake County on drug
related criminal matters.
Your Affiant has had training in controlled substance(s) identification and
investigation of controlled substance related offenses. Your Affiant is a Certified Peace
Officer in the State of Utah, and has Keen employed by the Salt Lake County Sheriffs
Office for six (6) years. Your Affiant has graduated from the Utah Police Officer
Standards and Training Academy.
Your Affiant's specialized training includes drug identification and recognition
courses taught by the Utah Peace Officers Standard and Training and the Police
Academy. Your Affiant has attended and completed a clandestine laboratory
certification course taught by experts in the field. Your Affiant has received a
certification to investigate clandestine laboratories and associated crimes involving the
production/extraction of the associated precursor chemicals.
Your Affiant has attended and completed a marijuana grow and investigations
class sponsored by the United States Military. Your Affiant has also attended and
completed an eighty (80) hour drug investigation course sponsored by The Rocky
Mountain High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area. (H.I.D.T.A.)
Your Affiant has made numerous drug related arrests involving the seizure of
controlled substances and interviewing suspects.
Your Affiant has investigated narcotic cases through trash covers, surveillance of
suspected drug sales operations, confidential informant controlled buys, interrogation of
suspects, and investigating intelligence reports received by citizens.
Your Affiant is currently investigating a complaint relating to the distribution of
a controlled substance, namely methamphetamine at the named premises on this
Warrant/Affidavit.
Your Affiant was able to articulate the following information and verify it through
personal observation:
Within the last thirtyfive(35)days, Detective John Wester received information
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from a concerned citizen that illegal narcotics activity was taking place at the residence
sought to be searched by this Warrant/Affidavit. During the last twenty (20) days, the
same concerned citizen, said a person by the name of Mario, was selling
methamphetamine from the residence sought to be searched.
On November 7,2003, your Affiant conducted a trash cover on the residence
sought to be searched by this Warrant/Affidavit. Your Affiant met with the driver of the
waste removal truck who is responsible for the trash pick up in this area. Your Affiant
checked the hopper area of the truck and it was seen to be empty. Your Affiant
accompanied the driver to the address sought to be searched by this Warrant/Affidavit
and observed as the contents of the trash can, located on the curbside infrontof the
address sought to be searched, were emptied into the hopper area of the waste removal
truck.
Your Affiant searched the contents of the trash and found thirteen (13) plastic
baggies that your Affiant knows illegal narcotics are commonly packaged in. In one of
the baggies, Your Affiant saw residue and seeds that in your Affiants experience
appeared to be marijuana residue and seeds. Your Affiant field tested the substance and
it field tested positive for marijuana. Your Affiant also found 5 twist type packaging
material that in your Affiants training and experience illegal narcotics are commonly
packaged in. Your Affiant knows through training and experience that the items found
are associated with drug possession and or distribution.
Within the last eighteen (18) days, your Affiant conducted at trash cover at the
residence sought to be searched by this Warrant/Affidavit. Your Affiant met with the
driver of the waste removal truck who is responsible for the trash pick up in this area.
Your Affiant checked the hopper area of the truck and it was seen to be empty. Your
Affiant accompanied the driver to the address sought to be searched by this
Warrant/Affidavit and observed as the contents of the trash can, located on the curbside
in front of the address sought to be searched, were emptied into the hopper area of the
waste removal truck.
Your Affiant searched the contents of the trash and found a homemade marijuana
pipe made of tin foil. This pipe had the odor of marijuana and your Affiant field tested
residue in the pipe and it field tested positive for marijuana. Your Affiant also found a
broken glass pipe that methamphetamine is commonly smoked in. Your Affiant also
found six (6) partial corners to plastic bags that had been cut off. Your Affiant knows
from training and experience that narcotics are commonly packaged this way. Your
Affiant saw residue on one of these plastic corners and your Affiant field tested the
residue on the plastic and itfieldtested positive for methamphetamine. Your Affiant also
found three (3) plastic bags and three (3) partial plastic bags. Your Affiant also found
four (4) plastic, twist type packaging materials. Your Affiant knows through training
and experience that the items found are consistent with illegal drug activity.
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Within the last three (3) days, your Affiant conducted at trash cover at the
residence sought to be searched by this Warrant/Affidavit. Your Affiant met with the
driver of the waste removal truck who is responsible for the trash pick up in this area.
Your Affiant checked the hopper area of the truck and it was seen to be empty. Your
Affiant accompanied the driver to the address sought to be searched by this
Warrant/Affidavit and observed as the contents of the trash can, located on the curbside
in front of the address sought to be searched, were emptied into the hopper area of the
waste removal truck.
Your Affiant searched the contents of the trash and found four (4) twist type
baggies, two (2) similar baggies and one of these had the corner of the bag cut off. Your
Affiant also found two (2) other baggies and one (1) large baggie. Your Affiant also
found two (2) small baggies that methamphetamine is commonly packaged in. Your
Affiant saw residue on one of these plastic baggies and your Affiant field tested the
residue and it field tested positive for methamphetamine. Your Affiant knows from
training and experience that the items found are consistent with illegal drug activity.
Your Affiant also found residency documents with the address sought to be searched by
this Warrant/Affidavit
During the last twenty five (25) days your Affiant has held surveillance at the
address sought to be searched by this Warrant/Affidavit. Your Affiant has seen vehicles
at the residence sought to be searched, and using the State of Utah maintained databases
your Affiant discovered that one of the registered owners of one of these vehicles has a
drug related arrest. The arrest was for possession of drug paraphernalia.
Your Affiant considers the information receivedfromthe concerned citizen(s)
reliable because: The concerned citizen(s) has placed him/herself at great personal risk by
providing assistance and information to law enforcement. The concerned citizen(s)
provided your Affiant with the location of the residence sought to be searched by this
Warrant/Affidavit, The concerned citizen(s) has not been promised anything in return for
the information provided. This address was verified using the Salt Lake County Sheriffs
Office resources. The concerned citizen was not in custody at the time the information
was given to your Affiant.
The concerned citizen(s) revealed this information to Detective Wester with the
understanding that their identities would not be revealed. Your Affiant requests that the
concerned citizen remain confidential: 1) Disclosure of the identity of the informants)
would endanger the safety and well being of the informant(s). 2) Disclosure would
destroy the informant(s) usefulness to law enforcement. Your Affiant asks the court not
to reveal the identity of the informant(s) for fear of physical retaliation by the suspects
involved in this case or by any of their criminal associates. Threats of physical harm
against individuals who are thought to be police informants are commonplace.
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Using the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office report system and The State of Utah
databases your Affiant conducted a records check on Angela Gallegos. It was found that
Angela has a Utah drivers license with the address sought to be searched by this
Warrant/Affidavit listed as her home address. A utilities check also confirmed that the
utilities are in Angela's name. Angela has no criminal history.
On November 5,2003, The State of Utah Division of Child and Family Services
was contacted by a concerned citizen, who was concerned about Santanna Sickler, who
is Angelas's five year old child. Your Affiant reviewed this complaint and the complaint
states that the mother is smoking methamphetamine in the house. The concerned citizen
also states that glass pipes have been found in the home and the pipes have been hidden
where the child would not find them. The complaint also alleges Angela cannot pass a
drug test.
Within the last nineteen (19) days your Affiant also contacted a State of Utah,
Division of Child and Family Services case worker. This case worker told your Affiant
she has had conversations with Angela Gallegos within the last twenty two (22) days and
Angela admitted to her that she uses marijuana in the home, but not around the child.
Your Affiant was also told by this case worker, that Randon Thomas lives at the
residence sought to be searched by this Warrant/Affidavit with her boyfriend, Mario
Cruz. This case worker also told your Affiant that she was told that Mario Cabrera used
to live at the residence sought to be searched but he had moved out. The case worker told
your Affiant that she was told Mario Cabrera stillfrequentsthe residence.
Your Affiant conducted a history check of calls made to, or action taken by the
Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office concerning the address sought to be searched by this
Warrant/Affidavit. It was found that Angela Gallegos has made several callsfromthe
address sought to be searched, and this same address has been listed as her home address
in the reports. Using The Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office report system your Affiant
found that Angela Gallegos had been involved in a domestic dispute with her father Able
Gallegos. Able told deputies one of the reasons he and Angela had been fighting was
because his ex-wife had found a glass pipe, like the kind commonly used to smoke crack
or methamphetamine, in Angela's purse. This report was taken July 1, 2003 and was
reported to the Sheriffs office under case number 03-76130.
Using The State of Utah maintained databases, your Affiant conducted a criminal
history check on Mario Cabrera. Mario has a criminal history of Assault, Possession of a
Controlled Substance Marijuana with Intent To Distribute, Possession of Narcotic
Equipment, Aggravated Burglary, Resisting an Officer, Driving Under the Influence, and
Disorderly Conduct. Mario has a Utah drivers license but it has been suspended due to
drugs. Mario currently has two active arrest warrants, one for speeding and one for
possession with intent to distribute a controlled/counterfeit substance.
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Using the State of Utah maintained databases your Affiant also discovered that
Randon Thomas has a criminal record that includes an arrest for Uttering a
Forged/Altered prescription and Failure to Comply.
Through your Affiant's training and experience it is known that packaging
material, cutting materials, scales, documents showing residency, evidence of distribution
of controlled substances, and U.S. currency are found where narcotics trafficking is
taking place and maintained on the named premises.
Your Affiant desires to search the persons who may be at the address sought to be
searched by this Warrant/Affidavit at the time of the Warrant service. Your Affiant
knowsfromtraining and experience that residences such as these that are involved in the
use, manufacture, or distribution of narcotics often are used as "flop houses" by the
persons who are found inside. Your Affiant knows from training and experience, that
persons inside are commonly there to purchase or use narcotics and will often have
narcotics and or paraphernalia hidden on their person.

Your Affiant has had this Warrant/Affidavit reviewed by Deputy District
Attorney: ^
^ Ml o (— C^Mc^Cand the Warrant/Affidavit has been approved for
presentation t6 the court.
WHEREFORE, your Affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for the seizure of said
items at any time day or night because there is reason to believe it is necessary to seize
the property prior to it being concealed, destroyed, damaged, altered, or for other good
reason to wit:
The cover of darkness would enhance an undetected approach to the residence
without endangering the safety of police officers or innocent uninvolved parties. It also
aids in defeating counter surveillance techniques used by illegal narcotic distributors.
The cover of darkness would enhance the ability to approach and enter the residence
while reducing the possibility to retrieve a weapon or arm any explosive device or trap to
defeat law enforcement Furthermore the address sought to be searched on this
Warrant/Affidavit is located in a residential neighborhood. Service of the search warrant
during the hours of darkness will insure the safety of neighbors, occupants of the address
sought to be searched, and other involved parties due to their presence in the area being
limited during those hours.

{fopetfi B. Watkins
Affiant
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this

^

day ofUouenber, 2003.

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SEARCH WARRANT
No.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

To any peace officer in the State of Utah:
Proof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by Jason Watkins, I
am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe
That your Affiant has reason to believe:
That

on the person of Gallegos, Angela Misty Marie, D.O.B. 06-13-1979, hispanic
female, 5'5,1201bs, brown hair, brown eyes

And

on the person of Thomas, Randon, D.O.B. 12-07-1981, white female, 5'6,
1201bs, brown hair, blue eyes.

And

on the person of Cabrera, Mario A., D.O.B. 11-07-1975, hispanic male, 5'4,
1601bs, black hair, black eyes.

And

on the premises known as 2843 South 8700 West, a single family dwelling,
described as sitting on the East side of the street, facing West, and having
yellow siding, and a greenish gray roof. Thefrontdoor is located on a raised
porch, faces West, and is white in color. The house numbers 2843 are located on
the steps leading up to thefrontdoor. To include all rooms, attics, basements, and
other parts therein, the surrounding grounds, storage rooms, storage areas, trash
containers, vehicles, and outbuildings of any kind located thereon.

And

on all persons who are in the address sought to be searched at the time of the
Warrant

In the city of Magna, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there is now certain property or
evidence described as:
1.

Marijuana, farther described as a green leafy substance; material related to
the possession or distribution of marijuana including bags, scales,
measuring devices; and drug paraphernalia described as rolling papers,
pipes, or other devices used for smoking marijuana.
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2.

Methamphetamine; a white crystalline substance in powder, solid or rock
form, a Schedule II controlled substance or any other illegal narcotics.

3.

Paraphernalia; to include but not limited to pipes, plastic bags, scales, and
other items commonly used to package drugs or to introduce drugs into the
human body.

4.

Residency papers; to include but not limited to utility receipts and/or bills,
rental/lease agreements, and articles showing occupancy of the premises.

5.

United States currency believed to be in close proximity to the narcotics
being searched for, and any and all items determined to be collateral or
proceedsfromnarcotics transactions.

6.

Narcotics records; to include but not limited to price lists, amounts sold,
times, dates, amounts purchased, who purchased, financial gain, and drug
indebtedness.

7.

Firearms; to include but not being limited to pistols, revolvers, rifles, semi
or fully automatic weapons determined to be proceeds of narcotics
transactions or used to protect narcotics activities.

8.

And any other item(s) determined to be fruits or instrumentalities of the
crime(s) of Possession and Distribution of a Controlled Substance.

and that said property or evidence:
was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed, or
has been used to commit or conceal a public offense, or
is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of committing or
concealing a public offense, or
consists of an item of, or constitutes evidence of, illegal conduct, possessed by a
party to the illegal conduct.

You are therefore commanded
at anytime day or night, good cause having been shown
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to make a search of the above-named or described person(s) and premises to
include all rooms, attics, basements, and other parts therein, the surrounding
grounds, storage rooms, storage areas, trash containers, vehicles, and outbuildings
of any kind located thereon for the herein-above described property or evidence
and if you find the same or any part thereof, to bring it forthwith before me at the
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, or
retain such property in your custody, subject to the order of this court.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated t h i s _ _ 2 = d a y of NweiBber^OIB.

Addendum B

DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
BYRON F. BURMESTER, Bar No. 6844
Deputy District Attorney
111 East Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900

PILED DISTRICT C0DKT
Third Judicial District
JUL 12 2004
SALT LAKE
•jf—

Deputy CisrK

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
-vs-

Case No. 031908515 FS

PAUL ANTHONY ARMIJO,
Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs
Defendant.
THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER CAME BEFORE the Court for hearing and
determination of the Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence, on Junell, 15, and 17,
2004. The Defendant was represented by Ralph Dellapiana. The State was represented
by Byron F. Burmester, Deputy District Attorney for Salt Lake County. Based upon the
testimony of Detectives Brent Jex and Jason Watkins, and the Preliminary Hearing
testimony of Detective Mike Ikemiyashiro, and Sergeant Mathews, memoranda, and the
arguments presented by counsel, and for good cause shown, the Court now makes and
enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On December 4, 2003, Salt Lake County police officers served a search
warrant at the Defendant's place of residence, 2843 South 8700 West.

2. The search warrant provided for a knock and announce search during day or
nighttime hours.
3. The officers were dressed in helmets, vests, and clearly marked uniforms.
4. As the officers approached the residence, just before sunrise, an unknown
vehicle began to turn into Defendant's driveway, and in doing so, its
headlights illuminated the officers approaching the home.
5. After illuminating the officers, the car quickly drove back out onto the street
and continued past the officers.
6. At that time, Detective Jex observed a passenger in the car talking on a cell
phone as the vehicle reversed and left the premises.
7. Several detectives testified that their on scene supervisor, Sergeant Mathews,
said that as the vehicle drove off he observed a light come on in the basement
of Defendant's home.
8. Sergeant Mathews communicated to the team, based on all of the
observations, that he thought they had been "burned" and their search was
compromised.
9. The officers were one residence away when the car noticed them, and they
took approximately another 10 seconds to reach the porch of the house.
10. Based on this assessment, the officers continued to approach Defendant's
residence, but abandoned the knock and announce protocol, and knocked
whiling forcing entry into the home and announcing their presence and
purpose.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Police officers may abandon knock and announce procedures if exigent
circumstances warrant a reasonable concern that: (1) evidence will be
destroyed, or (2) the officers' safety (or the safety of another) is at risk.
2. To determine if exigent circumstances existed in this case, the Court looked
subjectively through the eyes of the officers at the scene to assess the specific
facts of this case.
3.

Based on the vehicle illuminating the officers as they approached the home;
the testimony that it appeared as if a passenger in the vehicle was on a cell
phone; and the officer's testimony that Sergeant Mathews's saw a light come
on in the basement after the vehicle left the driveway, the Court concludes it
was reasonable for the officers to believe that exigent circumstances arose,
necessitating their rapid entry into the home for fear of destruction of evidence
and the safety of the officers.

Based upon the evidence offered by the parties, the arguments of counsel, and the
supporting memoranda, the Court denies the Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence.

DATED this &

day ofjjiae; 2004.
BY THE C

Read and Approved as to Form:
Ralph Dellapiatia ' '
Attorney for Defendant

nuni nniicT mm
DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
BYRON F. BURMESTER, Bar No. 6844
Deputy District Attorney
111 East Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900

Third Judicial District

JUL 12 2004
SALT LAKE poUNTY
tepSfy Clerk"

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
TN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

ORDER
Case No. 031908515 FS

-vsHonorable Dennis M. Fuchs
PAUL ANTHONY ARMUO,
Defendant.

Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED:
1.

The Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence is denied.

2.

A hearing is set for July 12,2004, at 8:30 a.m.

Ju-K
DATED this /£ day of-Jttee, 2004

BY THE COURT:

Hon. BJeppisJ.VL. j?m;ns> I
DistrictC6]arYJudge/ "t f
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUTY, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTE ENTRY AND DECISION ON
DEFENDANT ARMIJO'S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

v.
PAUL ANTHONY ARMIJO
Defendant.

Civil No. 031908515 FS
Judge Dennis M. Fuchs

^[1
Before the Court is Defendant Paul Anthony Armijo's ("Armijo" or "defendant") Motion
to Suppress evidence. Based on the record, and after review of the applicable law, the Court
finds for the plaintiff and denies the Motion to Suppress evidence.
UNDISPUTED FACTS
\2
On December 4, 2003, Salt Lake County police officers served a search warrant at 2834
South 8700 West. Judge Quinn had signed the warrant that allowed for day or nighttime search
but mandated a knock-and-announce procedure. The officers served the warrant at about five to
six o'clock in the morning.
T[3
As the officers approached the residence a vehicle pulled into the driveway. The
headlights from the vehicle illuminated the officers outside of the home. The vehicle then
immediately left the premises. Officer Matthews reported that a light then came on in the
basement of Armijo's home.
Tf4
The officers continued to approach the home. Upon reaching the front door, officers
knocked and announced their presence and intent but forcefully entered the home without
waiting for a response. Officers testified they entered the home without waiting because they felt
that the driver of the car that entered the drive way may have informed the defendant of their
presence and the defendant could destroy evidence before they entered the home. Once inside,
the officers began searching the home, announcing their presence and intent multiple times. The
officers found the defendant apparently asleep and unresponsive in the basement.
\5
After waking the defendant, a scuffle ensued. Eventually Armijo was taken into custody
and the search yielded drugs (specifically, methamphetamine) and drug paraphernalia. The
question before the court is whether the evidence in the search should be suppressed when the
officers serving the warrant dispensed with the required knock and announce procedure.

ANALYSIS
T[6
The Fourth Amendment guarantees that the "right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated." U.S. Const, amend. IV. Under Utah statute police serving a search warrant shall give
notice of their authority and purpose before entering the house except when the magistrate
issuing the warrant directs in the warrant that the officer need not give notice. Utah Code
Annotated § 77-23-210 (2003). The Supreme Court has held that the knock and announce
principle forms part of the reasonableness inquiry, obligating law enforcement to wait a
reasonable time after notifying the occupants of the home of their presence before forcibly
entering the home. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 930 (1995). However, opting for a caseby-case analysis instead of a rigid bright-line rule of reasonableness, the Supreme Court has held
that exigent circumstances may except an officer's not waiting to enter a residence after
announcing his or her presence. U.S. v. Banks, 124 S.Ct. 521, 525 (2003); Richards v.
Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997). The Supreme Court held that police must have a
"reasonable suspicion" of exigent circumstances to justify dispensing with the knock and
announce requirement when serving a search warrant. Id.
\1
In Wilson v. Arkansas the Supreme Court heard the case in which a police informant
made multiple drug purchases from the defendant, Sharlene Wilson. 514 U.S. 927. On
December 30, 1992 the defendant threatened the informant with an automatic pistol. Acting on
evidence and testimony of the informant, police officers secured a search warrant for the
defendant's home the next day and served the warrant the same day. Id. at 929. Because of the
defendant's violent criminal past and threats to the informant, officers dispensed with the knock
and announce requirement before entering the home; the defendant moved to suppress the
evidence collected in the search. Id. The Supreme Court held that the knock and announce
principle is part of the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness inquiry and that failure to knock and
announce may make a search unreasonable "in some circumstances". Id. at 934. The Court
stated that judges should consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether exigent
circumstances and countervailing interests of law enforcement justify a failure to knock and
announce. Id. at 935. Specifically, the Court stated, "unannounced entry may be justified where
police officers have reason to believe that evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice
were given." Id. At 936.
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In Richards v. Wisconsin the Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's conviction when
police did not knock and announce before serving a warrant to search the defendant's hotel
room. 520 U.S. 385. While officers had duly requested a warrant that allowed them to enter
without announcing their authority and purpose, the magistrate did not grant the request. Id. at
388. Officers arrived on the scene in plain clothes (one officer was in uniform) and originally
announced themselves to be maintenance workers. Id. When the defendant opened the door,
with a chain lock still engaged, he saw the officer in uniform and shut the door. Id. The officers
then forcibly entered the hotel room and apprehended the defendant as he tried to exit through
the bathroom window. Id. The Court held that "in each case, it is the duty of a court confronted
with the question to determine whether the facts and circumstances of the particular entry
justified dispensing with the knock-and- announce requirement." Id. at 394. The Court then

went on to say that u[i]n order to justify a cno-knock' entry, the police must have a reasonable
suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances,
would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by,
for example, allowing the destruction of evidence." Id.
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In U.S. v. Banks the Supreme Court overturned a Ninth Circuit Court, U.S. v. Banks, 282
F.3d 699 (9th Cir. 2002), decision to suppress evidence because waiting fifteen to twenty
seconds after knocking and announcing was an unreasonable amount of time. 124 S.Ct. 521.
Police, serving a search warrant at two o'clock in the afternoon, knocked on the defendant's door
and announced their authority and purpose loudly enough to be heard by officers in the back of
the house. Id. at 523. After waiting fifteen to twenty seconds with no response officers forcibly
entered the house; the defendant had been in the shower and claimed not to have heard the
officers' knocking. Id. The Court, in overturning the Ninth Circuit, said, "we have treated
reasonableness as a function of the facts of cases so various that no template is likely to produce
sounder results than examining the totality of circumstances in a given case." Id. at 525. Instead
of a bright line rule or list of acceptable exceptions, the Court determined that, even when a
warrant requires a knock and announce procedure, "if circumstances support a reasonable
suspicion of exigency when the officers arrive at the door, they may go straight in ... it is enough
to say that the facts known to the police are what count in judging reasonable waiting time." Id.
at 525, 527.
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The Supreme Court precedent establishes that the procedural aspects of serving a warrant
fall under the reasonable inquiry of the Fourth Amendment. However, the Court has recognized
that exigent circumstances and legitimate interests of law enforcement may justify dispensing
with the knock and announce requirement. In addition, the Court has refused to establish a
bright line rule as to when the requirement can be done away with. Instead, the Court says
judges should consider the totality of the circumstances and that law enforcement officers must
only demonstrate a "reasonable suspicion" that announcing their presence prior to entering
wouldfrustratea legitimate law enforcement purpose.
TJ10 In the Armijo's case officers were serving a warrant that required them to knock and
announce their authority and purpose and to wait a reasonable amount of time before entering the
residence. While approaching the house the officers were discovered by an unidentified car
pulling into the defendant's driveway. Shortly after the car pulled away Sergeant Matthews
reported seeing a light go on in the basement. Each officer testified that they believed they might
have been revealed by the driver of the car to the occupant of the home. The officers reasoned
that the occupant of the home could easily and quickly destroy crucial drug evidence. In light of
exigent circumstances officers decided to dispense with the knock and announce requirement of
the warrant. They forcibly entered the home, announcing their authority and purpose while
crossing the threshold. While the Supreme Court refused to make a bright line rule as to when
officers may dispense with the knock and announce requirement, it repeatedly gave potential
destruction of evidence or potential danger as an examples of what constitutes a justifiable
exigencies. In addition the decision to forego knocking and announcing must only be based on
the officer's reasonable suspicion. In this case it appears the officers had a reasonable suspicion
that the defendant could have attempted to destroy evidence while the officers waited a
reasonable amount of time outside.

1(11
Even assuming that no exigencies existed, the Court is not obligated to suppress the
evidence. In the state of Utah suppression of evidence "is only appropriate when conduct
implicates a fundamental violation of rights." State v. Ribe, 876 P.2d 403, 411 (Utah App.
1994). The fundamental interests supported by the knock and announce rule are "(1) the
protection of an individual's private activities within his home, (2) the prevention of violence and
physical injury to both police and occupants which may result from an unannounced police
entry, and (3) the prevention of property damage resulting from forced entry." State v. Buck, 756
P.2d 700, 701 (Utah 1988). Absent a fundamental violation of rights, suppression of evidence is
appropriate only if the search was "conducted in bad-faith or has substantially prejudiced the
defendant." State v. Rowe, 850 P.2d 427, 429 (Utah 1992). The Utah Supreme Court defined
substantial prejudice as "'the search might not have occurred or would not have been so abrasive
if the [r]ule had been followed'" and bad faith as '"evidence of intentional and deliberate
disregard of a provision of the [r]ule.'" Id.
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In State v. Ribe the Utah Appellate Court reversed and remanded the trial court's denial
of the defendant's Motion to Suppress evidence. 876 P.2d 403. As the officers approached the
defendant's home to execute a knock and announce search warrant, they saw the defendant
outside of the residence. Id. at 404. Upon seeing the approaching law enforcement officers the
defendant attempted to flee the premises but officers pursued and quickly apprehended the
defendant. Id. One officer proceeded to the front door of the residence; the front door was open,
except for a screen door, allowing the officer to view into the front room. Id. The officer
testified he saw neither a person nor any controlled substance in the living room. Id. Without
knocking but announcing he had a warrant, the officer entered the home and spotted the
defendant's wife sitting directly to the left of the door. Id. The court held that suppression of
evidence is "only appropriate when conduct implicates a fundamental violation of rights." Id. at
411.
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In State v. Buck the Court affirmed the trial court's denial of the defendant's Motion to
A.
Suppress when officers failed to knock and announce but the warrant did not violate the
JuM
defendant's fundamental rights. 876P.2d403. Acting on a tip from an informant, police
y^i
officers obtained a search warrant for the defendant's residence. Id. at 701. The magistrate did '
not grant a "no-knock" warrant, a fact that was overlooked by the officers serving the warrant/
Id. Officers directly entered the residence, finding it unoccupied. Id. During the search the
defendant arrived, at which time the officers announced their authority and purpose. Id. The
defendant moved to suppress the evidence collected because officers failed to knock and
announce prior to entering the residence but the trial court denied the motion. Id. The Supreme
Court of Utah affirmed the decision by holding that, because he was not home, the defendant's
fundamental rights of privacy and prevention of violence were not violated. Id. at 701-02. In
addition, the Court held that, where no one is present to respond to a knock and announce
warrant, failure to knock is not a basis for suppression of evidence because the officer serving
the warrant then can forcibly enter the residence after waiting a reasonable amount of time
without a response. Id. at 702.
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In State v. Rowe the Supreme Court of Utah reinstated the conviction that the appellate
court overturned on the ground that the evidence used against her was seized at night when the

affidavit justifying the search warrant contained insufficient information to allow a nighttime
search. 850 P.2d 427. The defendant was at the home of Stan Swickey when officers served a
search warrant and an arrest warrant. Id. at 427. After gathering her possessions and leaving the
premises, officers found a purse, later identified as the defendant's, that contained
methamphetamine. Id. at 428. When the defendant went to the police station to identify her
purse, she was arrested and subsequently convicted. Id. The Court held that where a
fundamental violation of rights does not occur a "procedural violation requires suppression of
evidence obtained only where it demonstrates prejudice to the defendant or a lack of good faith
on the part of the police." Id. at 430. "In order to show prejudice, defendant must establish that
absent the [procedural violation], 'the search would not otherwise have occurred or would not
have been so abrasive if the Rule had been followed.'" Id. (quoting U.S. v. Schoenheit, 856 F.2d
74,77(8thCir.l988)).
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In Armijo's case dispensing with the knock and announce requirement while serving him
did not implicate his fundamental rights. First, Armijo's right to privacy in his home was
implicated not by the entry into the home but by the validly acquired search warrant. Next,
Armijo scuffled with the officers after learning of their identity and purpose; hence, he
voluntarily gave up that right by lunging at the officers in his room. Finally, similar to Buck, the
officers had the right to forcibly enter if the defendant did not respond to the knock in a
reasonable time. Finally, given that the defendant was unresponsive to all the announcements
and physical prodding after the officers entered the home, it is likely he would not have
responded within a reasonable time. Accordingly, police did not substantially implicate his
fundamental right to prevent property damage. The only avenue left for the defendant is to
demonstrate prejudice or lack of good faith on the part of the police officers serving the warrant.
Nothing in the record attempts to demonstrate either that the search would not have occurred but
for the failure to knock and announce or that the officers intentionally disregarded the rule out of
bad faith.

ORDER
Tfl2

In summary, the Court: Denies Defendant Armijo's Motion to Suppress evidence.

So ordered this Tuesday, June 08, 2004. By the Court:

Dennis M. Fuchs
Third District Court Judge

